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REVIEWS
He was still a country lawyer when he said that American power does not
lie in military strength. "Our defense is in the preservation of the spirit which
prizes liberty as the heritage of all men, in all lands, everywhere." He con-
tinued soberly: When you become "accustomed to trample on the rights of
those around you, you have lost the genius of your own independence, and
become the fit subjects of the first cunning tyrant who arises."31
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GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY. By H. Street. Cambridge (Eng.l: Cambridge
University Press, 1953. Pp. 223. $5.00.
PROFESSOR Street's volume considers the capacity of the individual to sue
the State and other administrative bodies. This field is of growing import-
ance, for the prevailing tendency is to grant additional functions and greater
powers to government. Hence. there is an increasing need for legal remedies
against possible wrongs and abuses of government. Strange as it may seem.
this topic has not attracted sufficient attention from legal scholars in England
and in this country. Despite recent statutory enactments of considerable im-
portance, the majority of the scholars have perhaps failed adequately to ex-
plore the fundamental aspects of the problem and particularly the basic prin-
ciples on which liability of a modem State should be predicated. This is probably
one of the main reasons why, according to Professor Street, "English law
has not yet made a full contribution to the reconciliation of the freedom of the
individual and the authority of the State,"' and why "much reform is called
for [in England] before the individual has adequate legal protection against
the administration."
2
Professor Street's book contains a very interesting and successful re-examina-
tion of the entire problem of governmental liability. For its solution he does
not offer any magic formula; instead, he comes forward with a number of
specific suggestions based on a close analysis of the historical development
and the present status of the law in England and in this country, coupled
with a comparative analysis of the legal remedies against the administration
which have been devised in Western Europe, especially in France.
Following an historical introduction, which deals with the development
of the law of State liability in England, the United States and Western Europe,3
the author analyzes the main problems relating to State liability in tort,4 in
contract,5 in quasi-contract and as a result of expropriation. The author
31. III, p. 95.
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also examines the extent to which certain special remedies, such as declaratory
judgments and prerogative writs, can be resorted to against the State,7 and
the substantive and procedural limitations on State liability. Professor Street
deals with the basic theses of the book within the first three chapters and in the
conclusions (pp. 185-6), while in chapters IV to VI he examines, some-
what sketchily, questions of comparatively lesser importance.
The author exhaustively demonstrates that governmental immunities, both
substantive and procedural, originated in a feudal background as prerogatives
personal to the king.8 Immunity was reinforced by theories of the divine right
of kings and of absolute sovereignty, theories already obsolete at the time of
the American Revolution; yet the doctrine of state immunity was adopted in
this country and still prevails both in the United States and in England. to
the extent to which it has not been modified by specific statutory enactments
such as the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 9 and the Crown Proceeding Act
of 1947.10 The statutes whereby State liability is established are honeycombed
with exceptions, some of which, as the author shows, are hardly defensible;
furthermore, the courts are disinclined, on the whole, to construe those statutes
liberally.
The author also demonstrates that both in England and in the United
States the law governing the liability of the State and administrative bodies
is not uniform. "There are very important differences between the liability of
governmental and other public bodies. No satisfactory reasons for these differ-
ences are adduced."' 1 Moreover, administrative bodies, to the extent to which
they are liable, are made liable according to the principles of private law, even
though their very nature as organs of administration has compelled some
changes from private law. These changes, however, "have not been accompanied
by any recognition in theory that [the State and other administrative bodies]
are or should be placed in a category separate from private individuals. There
is, then, no separate law of administrative liability.
'"12
The author points out that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was superseded
in European countries by the principle of governmental liability at a much
earlier date and to a much greater extent than in England and the United States,
Professor Street devotes special attention to the evolution of the doctrine of
State liability in France, where it was mainly developed through a series of
decisions of the Conseil d'Etat, the highest administrative court, rather than
through statutory enactments. In France, liability of the State and other ad-
ministrative bodies is now the rule, but the administration can be sued and is
liable only when the official commits a faute de service, i.e., a wrongful act
within the scope of his functions. In the event of a faute de personne, i.e., a
wrongful act committed by an official beyond the scope of his functions, the
7. Pp. 131-2.
8. Pp. 143-65; 166-84.
9. 60 STAT. 842, 28 U.S.C. § 921 (1946).





administration is not liable but the officer may be sued in his individual capacity
in the civil courts. If there is a combination (cumdl) of both faults, then the
administration may be sued. Professor Street demonstrates that French ad-
ministrative law has developed two features of great merit: uniform rules
governing the liability of the State and other public bodies; and the predication
of the liability of the State and other administrative bodies on the risk inherent
in the performance of a public service rather than on fault. By way of con-
clusion, he suggests that the two principles should be adopted in England.
However, he would qualify the acceptance of the second feature: "[I]n so far
as private law rules are appropriate, there is no reason why those rules should
not be adopted. In the residuary circumstances where private law is inade-
quate, then uniform principles of public law, in accordance with the principles
made herein, should be adopted."' 3
Professor Street also mentions certain shortcomings of the French law of
administrative liability. He criticizes French administrative law, because "no
injunction or other enforcement provisions are permitted against the State.""4
In fact, however, some enforcement provisions against the State do actually
exist, although it is true that no injunctive relief may be granted. This is not,
however, a special feature of administrative law, for injunctive relief is seldom
granted by French law, not only in the field of administrative law. but also in
matters governed by private law. There is less merit perhaps to Professor
Street's contention that "the theory of cznund leads to official irresponsibility
with the attendant danger of a poor standard of public service."'' As pointed
out by Professor Bernard Schwartz in his recent book,"' the French Consdl
d'Etat has recently held in the Laruelle case (July 28, 1951) that in the event
of cmmul the State may have recourse against the official. Hence official irre-
sponsibility is no longer the rule; on the contrary, in most European countries
the modern trend is toward the recognition of the individual liability of the
officer. For instance, the Constitution of the Republic of Italy, which became
effective on January 1, 1948, provides in Article 28 that "employees and ser-
vants of the State and other public bodies are individually liable, according to
penal, civil and administrative law for [their] acts performed in violation of
rights. In such event the State and the other public bodies are subject to
civil liability jointly [with them]." According to the modern trend in European
countries, therefore, the State is jointly liable for damages in order to secure
recovery to the victim who otherwise might be unable to collect from an im-
pecunious officer; the latter, however, is not immune from prosecution and
liability.
Professor Street is opposed to the creation of special administrative courts
in common law countries. Possibly there is no need for the creation of such
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that the development of the jurisdiction of the Consedil d'Etat in France and of
similar specialized courts in other European countries is to some extent the
result of historical accident rather than of preconceived plans. It would be in-
correct, however, to oppose creation of administrative courts on the ground
that as a rule they are more subservient to the administration than courts of
general jurisdiction. The contrary is often true, at least in Europe. Being more
familiar with the administrative machinery and its shortcomings, judges of
administrative tribunals are less inclined than other judges to be awed by the
prestige of the government.
These criticisms of Professor Street's book are matters of opinion, and in
any event are minor ones. They cannot detract from the great value of his
work. The book deals effectively with some of the more difficult problems of
administrative law. It is clear, concise and convincing. It conclusively shows
that a careful and intelligent analysis of the provisions of foreign legal systems
may be of considerable assistance in improving corresponding provisions of
domestic law. This is comparative law at it best.
ANcLO PiERO SmuNIt
INTERSTATE COOPERATIOX: A STUDY OF THE INTERSTATE Co iPAcT. By
Vincent V. Thursby. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1953.
Pp. vi, 150. $3.25.
Tis modest volume concerns itself with the "Compact Clause of the Con-
stitution in public law."' Works in this field of compact endeavor have been
rather few. 2 This book, therefore, is a welcome addition.
In contrast with discussions of the compact device which have tended to
discount if not discourage its practice, Mr. Thursby's account might properly
be viewed as lending some encouragement to the use of compacts. Generally,
however, his work contemplates the field and renders a status report; those
in search of a method to deal with a particular problem of interstate coopera-
tion must still decide whether or not their problem can best be solved through
compacting.
The Founding Fathers, in a negative way, included in the Constitution
the authority to compact. Subsection 3, Section 10, Article I of that document
provides: "No State shall, without the consent of Congress, . . enter into
any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power ......
This bare authorization, or perhaps more properly recognition, of compacts
tAdj. Associate Professor of Comparative Law, New York University; Professor of
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